A Wikileaks, organização sem fins lucrativos da Suécia, publicou em seu perfil do Twitter, na noite de sexta-feira (13), que o presidente interino do Brasil, Michel Temer (PMDB), foi informante da Embaixada dos Estados Unidos no Brasil.
De acordo com os documentos divulgados, o peemedebista teria se correspondido com a embaixada via telegrama e o conteúdo seria classificado como "sensível" e "para apenas uso oficial". Segundo o Metrópoles, os arquivos foram transmitidos no dia 11 de janeiro de 2006, às 14h02 e no dia 21 de junho de 2006, às 16h05.
Temer informaria sua visão de como estava a situação política brasileira na época, opinião principalmente referente às eleições de 2006, quando Lula foi eleito. Ele teria analisado o cenário em que seu partido poderia ganhar a corrida presidencial. Além disso, falou sobre as diferenças entre Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva e Fernando Henrique Cardoso. O político teria dito que “as classes C, D e E acreditavam que Fernando Henrique teria roubado dos pobres e dado para os ricos. Já Lula roubado dos ricos para dar aos pobres”.
Os telegramas ainda apontam para uma possível disputa entre um candidato do PMDB com Lula, caso não houvesse acordo entre os partidos. Anthony Garotinho teria sido cogitado neste momento, mas haveria uma resistência no PMDB. Germano Rigotto, na época governador do Rio Grande do Sul, e Nelson Jobim, ex-ministro da Defesa, também foram cotados.Temer faría parte de uma lista de advogados poderosos e influentes que são informantes da CIA , mundo afora. O documento enviado desde São Paulo, teve como destino o Comando Sul dos EUA com sede em MIAMI.O Comando do Sul dos Estados Unidos é uma organização militar regional unificada e um dos 10 Comandos de Combate (COCOM ) do Departamento de Defesa dos EUA. Sua responsabilidade é planejar o contingente, as operações e cooperação das forças de segurança da América do Sul, Central e Caribe (exceto os territórios e possessões dos EUA na região), Cuba e as Bahamas e suas águas territoriais. O Comando do Sul é ainda responsável pela segurança de toda a região do Canal do Panamá.
Sediado atualmente em Miami, Flórida, e sob a liderança de um comandante de 4 estrelas, o efetivo do Comando do Sul é organizado em diretorias, comandos e forças-tarefa militares que o representam no sul do continente americano.
O Comando do Sul reúne mais de 1.200 militares e civis, integrantes do Exército, Marinha, Força Aérea, Corpo de Fuzileiros, Guarda Costeira e outras diversas agências governamentais dos Estados Unidos. As Forças Armadas fornecem ao Comando do Sul recursos e pessoal para suas forças tarefa: dois grupos de Operações Especiais, um de Inteligência, e gabinetes de segurança.A militarização dos objectivos da USAID culminou em 2010 quando o presidente Barack Obama incluiu o general Jeam Smith – um estratega militar que esteve na OTAN – no Conselho de Segurança, apenas com a função de acompanhar os programas de "assistência social" que a agencia tinha em andamento. E como director adjunto foi nomeado Mark Feierstein, cuja folha de serviços encaixava nos desafios que os EUA antevêm na região: perito em guerras de quarta geração – ou campanhas de desinformação –, e proprietário de Greenbarg Quinlan Rosler, uma empresa que proporciona orientação estratégica sobre campanhas eleitorais, debates, programação e investigação.
Alérgico aos governos populares que se estendem pela América latina, Feierstein comprovou a eficácia do seu método como assessor de Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada durante a campanha que o depositou na presidência de Bolívia. Goñi, como o chamavam na sua pátria, foi o paroxismo da colonização política que os EUA derramaram sobre os países do Sul nos anos noventa. Criado, educado e formado em solo estado-unidense, Sánchez de Lozada voltou à sua terra de nascimento para ser presidente pela mão de Feierstein. Durou no cargo pouco mais de um ano: o chamado "Massacre do Gás", em 2003, onde morreram mais de sessenta pessoas, ejetou-o do poder e devolveu-o aos EUA, onde vive como fugitivo da Justiça boliviana amparado pelo governo que colocou o seu amigo Feierstein à frente da USAID.
Nesse cabo, Temer faz uma análise da situação política no Brasil e do ex-presidente Lula, que ele afirma que sua presidência foi uma "decepção".
"Há uma desilusão pública com o presidente Lula e o Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT), este fornece uma oportunidade para o PMDB tem seu próprio candidato na eleição presidencial de 2006...
Em outra parte do documento, Temer se negou a prever os resultados das eleições, porém garantiu que haveria segundo turno: “qualquer coisa poderia acontecer”. Na ocasião, ele teria confirmado que o seu partido não apresentava candidatos à presidência e que o PMDB não seria aliado do PT e nem do PSDB, pelo menos até o segundo turno.
O presidente em exercício teria dito que o PMDB elegeria, em 2006, entre 10 e 15 governadores pelo país, além de ter também as maiores bancadas no Senado e na Câmara dos Deputados. Desta forma, o presidente eleito teria que se reportar ao PMDB para governar. “Quem quer que vença a eleição presidencial terá que vir até nós para fazer qualquer coisa”, avisou Temer.
Press releaseAbout PlusD
De acordo com os documentos divulgados, o peemedebista teria se correspondido com a embaixada via telegrama e o conteúdo seria classificado como "sensível" e "para apenas uso oficial". Segundo o Metrópoles, os arquivos foram transmitidos no dia 11 de janeiro de 2006, às 14h02 e no dia 21 de junho de 2006, às 16h05.
Temer informaria sua visão de como estava a situação política brasileira na época, opinião principalmente referente às eleições de 2006, quando Lula foi eleito. Ele teria analisado o cenário em que seu partido poderia ganhar a corrida presidencial. Além disso, falou sobre as diferenças entre Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva e Fernando Henrique Cardoso. O político teria dito que “as classes C, D e E acreditavam que Fernando Henrique teria roubado dos pobres e dado para os ricos. Já Lula roubado dos ricos para dar aos pobres”.
Os telegramas ainda apontam para uma possível disputa entre um candidato do PMDB com Lula, caso não houvesse acordo entre os partidos. Anthony Garotinho teria sido cogitado neste momento, mas haveria uma resistência no PMDB. Germano Rigotto, na época governador do Rio Grande do Sul, e Nelson Jobim, ex-ministro da Defesa, também foram cotados.Temer faría parte de uma lista de advogados poderosos e influentes que são informantes da CIA , mundo afora. O documento enviado desde São Paulo, teve como destino o Comando Sul dos EUA com sede em MIAMI.O Comando do Sul dos Estados Unidos é uma organização militar regional unificada e um dos 10 Comandos de Combate (COCOM ) do Departamento de Defesa dos EUA. Sua responsabilidade é planejar o contingente, as operações e cooperação das forças de segurança da América do Sul, Central e Caribe (exceto os territórios e possessões dos EUA na região), Cuba e as Bahamas e suas águas territoriais. O Comando do Sul é ainda responsável pela segurança de toda a região do Canal do Panamá.
Sediado atualmente em Miami, Flórida, e sob a liderança de um comandante de 4 estrelas, o efetivo do Comando do Sul é organizado em diretorias, comandos e forças-tarefa militares que o representam no sul do continente americano.
O Comando do Sul reúne mais de 1.200 militares e civis, integrantes do Exército, Marinha, Força Aérea, Corpo de Fuzileiros, Guarda Costeira e outras diversas agências governamentais dos Estados Unidos. As Forças Armadas fornecem ao Comando do Sul recursos e pessoal para suas forças tarefa: dois grupos de Operações Especiais, um de Inteligência, e gabinetes de segurança.A militarização dos objectivos da USAID culminou em 2010 quando o presidente Barack Obama incluiu o general Jeam Smith – um estratega militar que esteve na OTAN – no Conselho de Segurança, apenas com a função de acompanhar os programas de "assistência social" que a agencia tinha em andamento. E como director adjunto foi nomeado Mark Feierstein, cuja folha de serviços encaixava nos desafios que os EUA antevêm na região: perito em guerras de quarta geração – ou campanhas de desinformação –, e proprietário de Greenbarg Quinlan Rosler, uma empresa que proporciona orientação estratégica sobre campanhas eleitorais, debates, programação e investigação.
Alérgico aos governos populares que se estendem pela América latina, Feierstein comprovou a eficácia do seu método como assessor de Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada durante a campanha que o depositou na presidência de Bolívia. Goñi, como o chamavam na sua pátria, foi o paroxismo da colonização política que os EUA derramaram sobre os países do Sul nos anos noventa. Criado, educado e formado em solo estado-unidense, Sánchez de Lozada voltou à sua terra de nascimento para ser presidente pela mão de Feierstein. Durou no cargo pouco mais de um ano: o chamado "Massacre do Gás", em 2003, onde morreram mais de sessenta pessoas, ejetou-o do poder e devolveu-o aos EUA, onde vive como fugitivo da Justiça boliviana amparado pelo governo que colocou o seu amigo Feierstein à frente da USAID.
"Há uma desilusão pública com o presidente Lula e o Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT), este fornece uma oportunidade para o PMDB tem seu próprio candidato na eleição presidencial de 2006...
Em outra parte do documento, Temer se negou a prever os resultados das eleições, porém garantiu que haveria segundo turno: “qualquer coisa poderia acontecer”. Na ocasião, ele teria confirmado que o seu partido não apresentava candidatos à presidência e que o PMDB não seria aliado do PT e nem do PSDB, pelo menos até o segundo turno.
O presidente em exercício teria dito que o PMDB elegeria, em 2006, entre 10 e 15 governadores pelo país, além de ter também as maiores bancadas no Senado e na Câmara dos Deputados. Desta forma, o presidente eleito teria que se reportar ao PMDB para governar. “Quem quer que vença a eleição presidencial terá que vir até nós para fazer qualquer coisa”, avisou Temer.
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(C) SAO PAULO 623; (D) BRASILIA 1136;
(E) SAO PAULO 573 AND PREVIOUS; (F) SAO PAULO 30
SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED - PLEASE PROTECT ACCORDINGLY
-------
SUMMARY
-------
1. (SBU) Michel Temer, President of the Brazilian Democratic
Movement Party (PMDB), believes President Lula has done a masterful
job of disassociating himself from the political corruption scandals
that have crushed some of his closest advisers. He also has
effectively expanded social programs to earn the loyalty and support
of Brazil's lower-middle and lower classes. At the same time,
Lula's opponent, Sao Paulo ex-Governor Geraldo Alckmin, suffers from
a lack of charisma and a failure to have left a visible mark in five
years at the helm of Brazil's largest state. Nevertheless, Temer
declines to predict what will happen in this race, except to say it
will go to a second round, in which "anything can happen." He
confirmed that his own party will not run a candidate for president
and will not ally with either Lula's Workers Party (PT) or the
opposition Brazilian Social Democracy Party (PSDB), at least not
before the second round. However, the PMDB will win the governors'
races in at least ten and possibly as many as fifteen states, and
will again have the largest bloc in both the Senate and the Chamber
of Deputies, so that "whoever wins the presidential election will
have to come to us to get anything done." END SUMMARY.
----------------------
LULA'S SLEIGHT OF HAND
----------------------
2. (SBU) In a June 19 meeting with Consul General (CG) and Poloff,
Michel Temer, Federal Deputy from Sao Paulo, offered his assessment
of the balance of forces for the presidential election. Though
anything can still happen -- he has seen candidates overcome much
greater disadvantages than Alckmin currently faces, and win -- it is
clear that President Lula is in a strong position. Temer
dispassionately analyzed how Lula had seen his Chief of Staff and
the entire leadership of his party disgraced, and prominent
Congressional members of his party dragged through scandal, and had
emerged personally more or less untouched. This was partly because
other political parties -- Temer mentioned the PSDB and the Liberal
Front Party (PFL) but not his own PMDB, though his comment could
just as easily apply to them -- had, at different times, been
involved in affairs akin to the PT's infamous "mensalao" bribery
scheme, and were thus not eager to expose the PT's misdeeds to the
fullest.
3. (U) It was also because Lula had such a strong bond with the
people, the so-called C, D, and E classes - i.e., the lower-middle
and lower classes. Many in these strata, in Temer's view, believe
that Fernando Henrique Cardoso (FHC) had robbed the poor and given
to the rich, while Lula robs the rich and gives to the poor. Lula
has expanded the "Bolsa Familia" program from 6.5 million families
in 2004 to 8.7 million in 2005 to 11 million families this year, or
(assuming two children per family) roughly 44 million Brazilians.
This, combined with the increase in the minimum wage, the rise of
the Real against the US dollar, and the fall in the price of certain
basic food staples, make the poor much better off. Paradoxically,
many of the rich, especially bankers and other major financial
players, have also benefited from Lula's policies.
4. (SBU) It is the middle class that has suffered from both an
increasing tax burden and the loss of professional-level jobs. In
SAO PAULO 00000689 002 OF 004
truth, Temer continued, it is difficult to be optimistic about
Brazil's economic future. The fact of 11 million families eligible
for Bolsa Familia handouts implies a minimum of 44 million people in
abject misery in Brazil. He described a recent event he had
attended sponsored by the Institute for Industrial Development
Studies (IEDI), where Minister of Development, Commerce, and
Industry Luiz Fernando Furlan delivered an upbeat speech. When
challenged by a member of the audience with a few hard questions and
statistics, Furlan, who has himself been at times a tough critic of
the GoB's economic policies, was at pains to respond. Brazil faces
serious challenges in fostering growth, stimulating productivity,
attracting investment, improving infrastructure, and reducing
inequality; however, Lula's sleight of hand has made many voters all
but unaware of these growing problems.
--------------------------
ALCKMIN'S LACK OF CHARISMA
--------------------------
5. (SBU) Meanwhile, Alckmin is simply stuck. Temer believes that
since inheriting the governorship from Mario Covas in 2001, Alckmin
has provided honest, decent, competent government to Sao Paulo.
However, in a country that relishes superlatives, he did not
champion any great works, and his accomplishments are not visible.
Alckmin is not personally aggressive or charismatic and is not given
to showmanship, so he didn't leave a distinctive mark on the state.
By way of comparison, Orestes Quercia (ref C), Governor of Sao Paulo
from 1987 to 1990, was a controversial (many say corrupt) figure,
but he definitely left his mark on the state in the many streets and
highways and prisons and hospitals he built. (COMMENT: The same
might be said of colorful, and reportedly equally corrupt, former
Mayor and Governor Paulo Maluf. END COMMENT.) Former President
Cardoso was another example of a politician who had charisma. But
let's wait and see what happens, Temer suggested. Wait until after
the World Cup, which could impact on the voters in a variety of
different and not easily predictable ways, depending on the result.
Wait until the government-subsidized television advertising begins.
It will be "a great war" on the airwaves, and it opens up
innumerable possibilities for the underdog.
6. (U) Temer, a former Sao Paulo state Secretary for Public
Security, was not certain whether Alckmin would suffer as a result
of the recent violence on the streets and in the prisons of Sao
Paulo (ref E) perpetrated by the criminal gang First Capital Command
(PCC). Some of his public criticism of his successor, Governor
Claudio Lembo, had been unfortunate and not good for his image. But
only time will tell how this situation plays out.
------------------------
LULA'S TURN TO THE LEFT?
------------------------
7. (SBU) CG asked what a second Lula term would look like, assuming
he is re-elected. Unlike some of our interlocutors, Temer believes
Lula may take a more radical (i.e., populist) approach during a
second term. The recent incident in which radicals from the
Movement for the Liberation of the Landless (MLST) stormed the
Chamber of Deputies (ref D) and committed acts of vandalism was a
harbinger of things to come. The group's leader, a member of the
PT's Executive Committee, had on many occasions over the years been
seen at Lula's side. The PT had suspended him, but had taken no
further action and did not appear particularly upset over the
episode, Temer noted.
8. (SBU) Lula, in Temer's view, was a trade unionist who had done
well for himself, who, once re-elected, might finally begin to heed
his friends on the left. Very possibly he would let himself be led
SAO PAULO 00000689 003 OF 004
away from the orthodox macro-economic policies that have dominated
his first term. (COMMENT: Some other observers have also pointed to
the GOB's expansion of social spending in recent months as an
indication that Lula is drifting left. Thus far, however, this
spending seems in line with the pump-priming measures of most
incumbents seeking re-election. While Temer sees Lula's campaign
pitting "rich versus poor" as a sign of things to come in a second
term, many analysts who have followed Lula's career characterize him
as a "cultural conservative" who is unlikely to succumb to the
radical leftist/populist temptation. A more worrisome, and more
likely, scenario is a second-term Lula government that lacks the
policy direction, political will, and working majority in Congress
required to push through essential economic and political reforms.
END COMMENT.)
------------------------------
PMDB - A HOUSE (STILL) DIVIDED
------------------------------
9. (SBU) Turning to his own party's fortunes, Temer confirmed
reports that the PMDB will not run its own candidate for President,
and will not enter into a formal alliance with either the PSDB or
the PT. Any of these options at the national level, he explained,
would damage the party's chances in some of the states because the
"verticalization" rule remains in effect during the 2006 elections.
The recent ruling by the Superior Electoral Tribunal (TSE), which
would have tightened even further the rules governing party
alliances (ref B), was probably correct, Temer averred, even though
it would have been disastrous for the PMDB. If you're going to
require parties to replicate their national alliances at the state
level, it makes perfect sense to go a step further and say that
parties that don't run or formally support presidential candidates
may not ally at the state level with parties that do. Nevertheless,
as the head of a party whose lifeblood is coalition-building at the
state level, Temer was relieved when the TSE reversed itself within
48 hours, and he looked forward to the 2010 elections when the
Constitutional amendment abolishing the "verticalization" rule
altogether would enter into force.
10. (SBU) If the presidential election goes into a second round, as
Temer is sure it will, the PMDB may at that point throw its support
to one side or the other. The PMDB remains split almost evenly
between the pro- and anti-Lula groups. The former seeks alliances
with the PT and hopes for several Ministries in Lula's second
administration. Temer, who is anti-Lula, was highly critical of the
pro-Lula faction and commented wryly over some of the party's
internal contradictions and divisions. Renan Calheiros, President
of the Senate, is the leader of the PMDB's pro-Lula faction; yet, in
his home state of Alagoas (northeast), the PMDB will support the
PSDB's gubernatorial candidate, Senator Teotonio Vilela. Another
pro-Lula leader is Senator (and former President) Jose Sarney, but
his daughter, PFL Senator Roseana Sarney, will be running for
Governor of Maranhao (also in the northeast) with PMDB support
against a PT candidate. Temer outlined the situation state by
state, ending with Sao Paulo. The PSDB, he noted, badly wants an
alliance with the PMDB, but they want to choose the PMDB candidate
to be Jose Serra's running mate. This issue will be resolved within
the week, since the PMDB holds its state convention on June 24. The
party will not hold a national convention June 29 as originally
planned, since all its issues at the national level were resolved at
a preliminary June 11 caucus.
11. (SBU) Temer, who himself had strongly favored fielding a PMDB
presidential candidate (ref F), noted that by relinquishing this
ambition, the PMDB stands to win the governors' races in ten or
perhaps even fifteen states, and will again have the largest blocs
in both the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies. Thus, whichever
SAO PAULO 00000689 004 OF 004
party wins the Presidency will inevitably have to seek an alliance
with the PMDB in order to govern. Temer spoke caustically of the
Lula administration's miserly rewards for its allies in the PMDB.
They give the job of Minister to a PMDB loyalist, but no real
control over the Ministry; thus, he can't accomplish anything. In
contrast, Temer believes that in return for joining a governing
alliance, the party should be given control over a sector of the
economy, agriculture, say, or health, and full responsibility for
operating that sector, and should receive full credit or blame for
the successes and failures in that sector. (COMMENT: Left unsaid,
of course, is that the sort of control Temer envisions would also
give the PMDB, and other allied parties, the opportunity to advance
their political patronage goals at the taxpayers' expense. The
PMDB, which is Brazil's largest political party, is already
well-known as a vehicle for patronage. END COMMENT.)
-------
COMMENT
-------
12. (SBU) Temer was more charitable in his assessment of Alckmin's
campaign and his performance as Governor than Alckmin's own PSDB
colleague, Andrea Matarazzo (ref A). Nevertheless, Temer's critique
hits home: Alckmin may perform in the coming months, but so far he
simply has not connected at any level with the electorate. Lula's
job performance, on the other hand, may be open to question, but his
ability to communicate with and relate to the average Brazilian is
unsurpassed. Temer is correct that whichever candidate wins will
need to turn to the PMDB for support in governing. The real problem
is that the PMDB has no ideology or policy framework that it could
bring to the task of formulating and implementing a coherent
national political agenda. Despite the party's illustrious history
as the guiding force that led Brazil from military dictatorship to
democracy, the PMDB, which now holds the balance of political power,
has devolved into a loose coalition of opportunistic regional
"caciques" who for the most part - and there are exceptions - seek
political power for its own sake. Such a party is hardly suited to
the task of providing political direction, which would be
particularly important in a post-election alliance with Lula's
rudderless PT. END COMMENT.
13. (U) This cable was coordinated/cleared with Embassy Brasilia.
MCMULLEN
| References to this document in other cables | References in this document to other cables |
|---|---|
| 06SAOPAULO67608SAOPAULO67609BRASILIA1194 |
If the reference is ambiguous all possibilities are listed.
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